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1. Introduction
Because  of negotiating  costs, it  is economical  for a cartel to fix  its
control  variables  over  a  per'iod of time wjthout updating  them  to ful ly
exploit changes  in mar  ket conditjons.  Pnices and  quantities  cannot be
simultaneously  fixed  jf  there are changes  in demand.  However,  prices can
be supported  by varyjng production  or,  alternatively,  quantities  can  be
fixed  with  prices  allowed to  change  to clear the market.  The  question
ari  ses  as to whether  the cartel  should prefer  one  control  strategy  to
a  n  other.
The  choice  between  price-setting and  quantity-settjng has  been  studied
previously  by Weitzman  (1974)  for the case  of a regulated  industry  and  by
Young (1979)  for the case  of a nation choosing  between  tariffs  and  quotas
as a means  of restrjcting  internationa.l  trade.  The  problem  we  envision  is
one  in  which  a  cartel  chooses to  fix  eithe|its  prices or quantities
through  peniods  of changing  demand  rather than  incur  the  high  costs  of
internal negotiations  which  wou.ld  arise if  operatjng  strategies were  always
updated  to reflect  current  market conditions.  Because  plans  must be
fonmulated before  the  realization  of  demand,  the  problem is  one  of
decision-making  under  uncertainty.  An  optimal  control  slrategy  'i  s  one
which  provides large  expected aggregate  profits  and  which  also enhances
cartel stabjlity  by promoting  a stable internal distribution  of  aggregate
profi  ts.L
We begin  in  Section  2  with  a  model of  a  cartel  that offers a
homogeneous  product.  Such  a model has  ljttle  to  say  about whether a
particular  control  strategy  promotes internal  stabil  ity.  But jt  is a
useful model  for determining  which  of the tvio  strategies, price-setting  or
quantity-setting,  offers  greater  expected aggregate profits.  To keep
things simple,  we  use  a  single-period model and  ignore  other  cartel
problems  such  as output sharing  and  cheating.l/
Matters  are  more compl  icated  when the  cartel offers more  than one
economical  ly di  stinct product.  Consider  the case  of  0PEC  which  suppl  ies
crudes of different  viscosity.  Because  membens  are endowed  with different
proportions  of light  and  heavy  crude,  control strategies can  differ  in  the
evenness  with  which  changes  in market  conditions  affect member  countries.
A ranking  of control strategies should  then involve not only  a  comparison
of  the di  stributjons of aggregate  profits,  but also of the extent to which
membersr  fortunes  tend to ri se  and  fa  l  I  together.  0ther" thi  ngs  bei  ng
equal  ,  an  optimal  control strategy should  lend stability  to the cartel by
providing  positive coyarjance  between  members'  profits  and  low  var.iance in
their  shares  of aggregate  profiLs.
In  Sect'ion 3  we  develop  a simple  multi-producl  model  to compare  the
stabjlity  properties  of  various  control  strategies.  The  model  is
structured  to  depict  the  decision  problem  faced  by OPEC.  There  are two
producing  groups  within the cartel--one endowed  with heavy crude  and  the
other  with light  crude.  Heavy  crude  is more  difficult  than light  crude  to
refine into final  products,  and  the unit cost difference is assumed  to rise
with  the amount  of heavy  purchased. Randomness  appears  through  the demand
for f inal products.3
To abstract from  points covered in  Section  2,  suff  ic'ient  algebraic
structure  is  imposed  on  the  multi-product  model  to ensure  that maximum
expected  profits  are the same  regardless  of the control stl"ategy employed.
This  allows  us  to  easi  ly  compare  strategies 'i  n more  subtle  dimensjons.
Section  4 uses  the model to  compare  the  effects  of  price-setting  and
quantity-setting  on the covariance  of members'  profits  and  the variance  of
their  shares  of aggregate  profits.  Sectjon  5 uses  the  same  criteria  to
eval  uate  the performance  of mixed  strategies, which  jnvolve setting both a
pflice  and  a quantity.
In Section  6 we  draw  upon  recent  events  in  the  world  ojl  market to
i l  I  ustrate  some of  the  theoreti  cal  pri  nci  pl  es  deve'loped  i  n Secti  on 4.
Ev'idence  is presented  to show  how,  because  of  0PECrs  rel  iance  on  price
controls,  an unexpectedly  weak  demand  for oil  products  in the 1980s  led to
disproportionate  reductions  in production  among  members  and  how this,  in
turn,  precipitated a number  of unilateral and  destabilizing actions  wjthin
the cartel  .  The  main  points of the paper  are summarized  in Section  7.
?.  Comparisons  involving expected  aggregate  profits
The  most  basi  c way  in whi  ch pri  ce-setti  ng  and  quanti  ty-setti ng  coul  d
differ  is  in their  capacities  to generate  aggregate  profits.  It  js natural
then to begin  by comparing  the maximum  expected  profits  available under  the
two strategies.  The  simplest  model  with which  to make  this  comparison  'i  s a
single-period, single-product  model  of a  joint  profit-maximizing cartel  .
The  carLel is assumed  to face a demand  curve  with additive randomness.  For
the moment,  we  also ignore  any  costs of production. The decision  problem
of the cartel  is then to(  1) Max E(r) = E(PQ)
s.t.  Q  = c - f(P)
where c  is  a  random  variable,  P  is  product  price, and  Q is quantity
suppl  ied.  Under  a  pri  ce-setti  ng  strategy,  pri  ce  i  s  determi  ned  before
demand  is  realized, and  quantity is adjusted  ex post to clear the market.
Under  quantity-setljng,  it  is quantity that is predetermined  and  price that
adjusts to actual market  conditionr.?/
Fol  l  owi  ng  Wei  tzman, we  assume  that  the  randomness  i  n  demand  i  s
sufficientiy  smal  I  as  to  justify  a  second-onden  approximation  to  the
quantity-setting  profit  function.  It  'i  s shown  in the appendjx  that the
optimal quantity under quantity-setting  (Q*)  then  equals  the  expected
quantity  under  optimal  price-setting (Q).  Further, the difference between
maximal  expected  profits  'in the two cases  can  be  written as
(2) E(n)l  - E(n)  %qflAl":
P:k  Q*  [f,(P*)]3
where  o2 is the variance  of  c. If  demand  i  s  nonrandom,  there  is  no
di  fference  between the  expected profits  of  the  two strategies.  Wjth
randomness  in demand,  however,  the comparison  hinges  upon  the nature  of the
curvature  in  the  demand  functjon.  Specifically,  the maximum  expected
profjts  available through  price-setting wi  l1 exceed (fall  short  of)  theR
maximum  expected profits  avaiIable through  quantjty-setting if  demand  is
concave  (convex)  in pri  ce.
These  results must  be qualified if  there  afe  nonlinearities  in  the
cartel's  cost  function.  This is easy  to see  because  costs are assumed  to
be  free  of  stochastic  elements.  From Jensonrs inequality  and  the
(approximate)  equality between  Q and  Q*, we  have
Etc(a)llp* < (>)  C(Q*) as  C  is concave  (convex)  in Q
where C  denotes the  cartel's  total  costs.  Thus,  optimal expected  costs
wi  I  I  be smal  I  er (  l  arger) under  pri  ce-setti  ng  than  under quanti  ty-sett'ing
when costs  are  concave  (convex)  in output.  Accounting  for both revenues
and  costs, price-setting unambiguously  provides  larger expected  profits  if
demand  is  concave in price and  costs are concave  in output.  If  both the
demand  and  cost functions are convex  jn thejr  anguments,  maximal expected
profits  will  be larger under  quantity-setting.  Comparisons  in other cases
involve the relative degrees  of curvature  in the two  functions.
3.  A simple  multi-pnoduct  model
If  cartel members  produce  different  products,  the internal distribution
of  aggregate  profits  may  be more  sensjtive to fluctuations in demand  under
some  control strategies than others.  If  so, a control strategy  should be
evaluated  not only on the basis of its  expected  aggregate  profits,  but also
on jts  ability  to reduce  the variabjlity  in the  internal  distribution  of
prof  j  ts.6
0ur analysis  of this  jssue  wil1 be specialized  in th/o  respects.  First,
the structure of demand  is  fashioned  after  the  worid  oiI  market,  Vrlhile
some generality  'i  s  jnevitably  1ost,  we  are  able to more  specifically
identify those  control strategies that would  be  relatively  successful in
insulating  0PEC  from  large swings  in its  jnterna'l  djstribution of profits.
Second,  an algebraic structure is  imposed  on  the  model to  ensure that
expected aggregate  profits  are invariant to the control strategy selected,
This allows us to abstract from  points already  covered  in SecLion  2, and  it
results  in  simple expressions for  higher-order  moments  of the relevant
profi  t  distributions.
An oi1-producing  cartel  is  assumed  to  consist  of  tv/o groups--one
endowed  with  heavy  crude  and  another  endowed  with light  .rud".9/  Because
of the short time horizon  implicil  throughout  the paper  (a honizon  equal  to
the  time bet!,/een  cartel negotiations),  we ignore  all  complications  arising
from resource  exhaustion  and  the finiteness of reserves. The  model  is once
again  a  single-period model.  We shall  also  assume  that there are no
external sources  of  oil  .!/  The  market  demands  fon heavy and  light  crude
are then the same  as those  faced  by the cartel  .
Crude  oil  demands  are derived from  a demand  function for final  products
and  from  representations  of refinery costs.  The  demand  for final  products
is taken  to be
(4) Q=c-bP.7
The  term  o is a random  variab'le,  and  it  is the only source  of randomness  in
the model.  Linearity is assumed  in (4) in order to eljminate  the effect of
strategy chojce  on expected  aggregate  profits.
0ur  description  of  refinery  costs  is  intended to  capture  two
chal'acteri  stics  of  refin'i  ng  technology.  Fjnst,  heavy crude  is  more
difficult  than  light  crude  to refine jnto final  products.  Second,  while
refjneries designed  for processing  heavy  crudes  can  also accommodate  light
crudes,  light  refjneries  are  incapable of  processing heavy crudes.
Refinery  capacity  is then more  quickly approached  for heavy  crudes  than for
'l 
ight  crudes.  To  model these  characteristics  in  as  simple  terms  as
possible, suppose  that each  unit of  final  product  can  be  refined  from
ei  ther  one  uni  t  of  heavy crude  ol-  one  uni  t  of 1  i  ght crude.  We  wi  I  I
abstract from  any  possibl  e I  osses  of  materi  al  through processi  ng.  Al  so




l^  =D  I -L  'L'
C, = PrH  + 26g2
where  P,-  and  P, denote  the prices, and  L and  H the quantities, of light  and
heavy crude, respectively.  Thus,  for equal  prices of heavy  and  Iight,  the
marginal  (and  average)  cost of processing  heavy  crude  exceeds  the  marginal
(avenage)  cost of processing  1ight.  The  difference in costs rises with the
amount  of heavy  refined, as heavy  refineries approach  capacity.8
0i1 refining is assumed  to be  competitjve.  The market demands  for
heavy and  light  crude are  derived  by first  using  (5) and  (6) to obtain
refinery demands,  and  then using (4) to  integrate  the  market for  final
products.  The  resulting demand  functjons are given  by
(7) H  = (Pr-P*)/c
L=a-bPr-(Pr-Pr)/c. (8)
Heavy and  light  crude  are  substitutes,  of course.  Also noLe  that the
randomness  fnom  the demand  for  final  products  appears  only  in  the  demand
for  light  crude.:'
it  is well known  that optimal  depletion  is  sequential  , wjth the better
quality deposits  mined  first.9/  Thi, resu'lt  is  also  a  property  of  our
model  .  An  unconst.rained  maximization of  expected aggregate profits
requires  that heavy  crude  be  entirely  withheld  from  the  market.  Side
payments  should be  made to  provide  heavy  producers  wjth incentives  to
remain  inactive.  Such  arrangements  are not practiced, of  course,  neither
in  OPEC  noli  n other cartels.  Thus,  to ensure  that some  heavy  production
js undertaken,  while at the same  time avoiding  the  question of  how the
sharing agreements  are  made, we  assume  that  the selection of control
vari  abl  es i  s constra  ined  bv
rro\ E(H)  = eE(L).9
Eq. (9) requires  that expected  outputs
one  another.  Through a  suitable
achieve  any  desired  ratio  of expected
As a final  simplification, we  shal
7/
production.l'  The  deci  sion-problem  of
I  ie i  n a predetermi  ned  proportion
choice of  0, it  is also possible
profi  ts.
I assume  that there are no  costs




(  10) Max E(n)  = E(P*H  + P'-L)
s.  t.  (  7)-(  e).
Under a  prjce-setting  strategy,  the prices of light
chosen  lo maximize  expected  aggregate  profits.  0utputs
demands are  real  ized  so  as  to  support these
quantity-setting strategy, it  is Lhe  quantities of liqht
determined  ex  ante,  with  prices  al  lowed to  adjusL
and heavy  crude are
are  adjusted when
nrino<  llndcv'  ,
and  heavy  that are
to  actual market
c  onot  tt 0n  s.
Analytic solutions for the control variables  are provided  'in  Table  1.
Because  of  the  simple algebraic  structure  used in  (10), the optimal
expected  val  ues  of  these  vari  abl  es  are  i  ndependent  of  the  parti  cul  ar
strategy  employed.  For example,  the optimal price of light  crude  under  a
prjce-setting strategy is  Lhe  same  as the expected  price of light  under  the
optimal  quantity-setting  strategy.  This  implies  that maximum  expected
profits  are the same  regardless of  the  strategy  used.  The  strategies
differ,  however,  in higher-order  moments  of membersr  profit  distributions.
It  is  to these  comparisons  that we  now  turn.10
4.  Comparisons  jnvolving variation in the internal distribution of profits
Issues  of stability  in cartel  theory  are  generally  of  a  long-term
nature,  vrjth  emphasis  on  equitable  arrangements  for reducing  output and
effective means  of enforcing  price agreements. For  0PEC  in  particular,
stability  is  often  judged  by the willingness  of nations  with the largest
reserves  and  lowest immediate  revenue needs to  make the  bul  k  of  the
production cuts that are necessary  if  monopoly  power  is to be exerci  sed,9/
In contrast, the concept  of stabil  ity  explored  here  deals  with  the  extent
to whjch  fluctuations in demand  are absorbed  evenly  by cartel members.  The
more  equitable the arrangements  for  sharing  risk,  the  more stable  the
cartel -
The  basic differences between  price-settjng and  quantity-setting can  be
seen  in Figure  1.  The  line labelled 
-D-0 
represents the  mean demand  for
final  products.  The  optimal expected  price of final  products  js assumed  to
be Pl, which is lhe same  as the expected  price of  light  crude  given  the
simple way  in which  we  have  described  the light  oil  refinery process. The
expected  quantity of final  products is  (H*+L*),  the  sum of  the  mean
quantities  of  heavy and  l  ight  crude.  The breakdown  between  expected
quantities is deternjned  by the parameter  0.  The  optimal  expected  prjce of
heavy cr  ude  equales  the marginal  cost of heavy  refining with the marginal
cost of light  nefining.  This requires  that the expected  price of heavy be
Pi.
Figure  1  can  now be  used  to show  the effects of a deviation in the
demand  for  final  products.  Suppose  that  Lhe  actual  demand  for  final
products  i  s  D'Dr  nather  than  DD.  Under  a pri  ce-settj  ng strategy, theprices of light  and  heavy  remain  fixed at ei ana  eff.  llargina1 costs  must
be  equalized for  refiners  to  be in equilibrium.  This implies that the
quantity of heavy  actually sold must  be H*, the same  as its  expected  value.
The  quantity  of  l ight  so1d,  however, will  be  (Q'-H*).  All  of the
unanticjpated  jncrease  in final  demand  is produced  with light  crude.  Thjs
occurs because  of  our  assumption  that 
'l 
iqht refining is a constant  cost
operation,  whi'le  heavy  refining is  subject  to increasing  costs.  A similar,
though less  extreme, result  would emerge if  al  l  refining  exhibited
increasing  costs, but capacity  constraints  \{ere  more  rapidly approached  for
heavy  crude  than for  light  crude.
0n  the  other  hand,  suppose  that the cartel had  adopted  a strategy  of
quantity-sett'ing. The  quantities of heavy  and  l  ight would  be invariant  to
deviations in final  demand.  However,  with actual demand  at D'D', the price
of final  products,  and  hence  the price of iight  crude,  would  equal  P'.  And
since  the  quantity  of  heavy crude  js  fixed  at H*, there could  be no
variation in the pnice  differential .  Thus  the price of  heavy would also
devi  ate  from  i  ts  mean by  the  amount  (  P'-Pl)  .  Wi  th a quanti  ty-setti ng
strategy, unant'icipated  changes  jn demand  have  the same  qualitative  impact
on the profits  of all  cartel members.
To  more fonmal  ly  compare  the  two  strategies,  Table  2  provides
expressions  for the second-order  moments  of the  indivjdual  and  aggregate
profit  distributions.  0ur  particular  jnterest  js  in the evenness  w'ith
which  random  fluctuations in demand  affect member's  orofits.  There  are  at
least  tr,/o  ways  of approaching  this question.  One  could simply  compare  the
covariances  of the profits  of the t"o g"orpr.9/  According  to this measure,72
quantity-setting  \rould clearly  be  preferred  to  price-settin9.  When
quantities are fixed, prices and  hence  profits  correlate positively.  Under
price-settjng,  the  profits  of  heavy producers  are nonrandom,  wh'i  le the
profjts  of l  ight producers  rj se or fal l  with demand.
Alternatively,  the stability  of each  strategy  might  be measured  by  the
variances of  members'  shares  of aggregate  profits.  Since  there are only
lwo groups  in the model  , this would  be eqrivalent to simply  comparing  the
variances of  the  ratio  of group  profits,  Var(n,/nr).  The  variance  of a
rati o of random  vari  abl  es wi  I  I  tend lo  be  smal  I  er  the  sma'l  I  er  are  the
jndjvidual  variances and  the  gredter  is  the  covariance between  the
variab.les. As can  be seen  from  Table  2,  the  quantity-setting  strategy
offers  a  smaller  vaniance  in n, and  a greater covariance. Each  tends  to
reduce  the variance  of r,/t,,.  However.  the variance  of n,, is clearl.y  lower
LTJH
under pfice-setting,  since the profits  of heavy  producers  are independent
of random  fluctuations in demand.  This effect can  dominate  if  the exoected
profits  of  the  heavy-producing  group  are sufficiently  sma11.  Thus  it  is
not generally  possibie  to rank  the variances  of nr,/nr.
Something  conclusive can  be  said,  however, if  the  ouLput-sharing
parameter 0  is  selected  so as to equate  the expected  profits  of the two
groups.  In this case,  the variance  of n,/nu can  be approximat"d  bylQ/
(11) Var(n,_,/ng) (nr)-2{  var(  n; - 4Cov(nr,nr)}
llhich strategy  yields
a  sma  l ler  variance
a smal  I  er vari  ance
of n,,/nr, dePends
of profi  t  shares,  or  equi  val  ently
only upon  the valiance  of agg  regateIJ
profjts  and  the covariance  of group  profits.  The  quantjty-setLing  strategy
provides a  smaller  variance  of aggregate  profits.  Therefore,  it  offers a
smaller  varjance  of profit  shares.  Thjs  can  be  demonstrated  with  the
formulas 'in  Table  2.  0r return to Figure  l  and  consjder  the effects of a
deviation in demand  on aggregate profits.  Under price-settjng,  profjts
increase by  the area "abcd".  Under  quantity-setting, profits  increase  by
the area  "aefg".  A ranking  of the two areas  depends  upon  the elasticity  of
demand  for  final  products.  It  js easy  to show  that,  in a neighborhood  of
the mean  equilibrium, the elasticjty  of final  demand  is greater  than  one.
Thus,  the  deviation  in  final  demand  produces  a greater djsturbance  in
aggregate  profits  under  price-setting than under  quantity-setting,
In summary,  control strategies  can  differ  in the  evenness  with  whjch
fluctuations  in  demand  affect  membersr  profits.  In  our  model  of an
oi1-producing  carlel  , a greater covaniance  of  group profits  js  achjeved
when quantities  ane  fixed  than when  prices are fixed.  Which  of the two
strategies  yields  a  smal  ler  variance of  profit  shares depends  upon
agreements  concernj  ng  the  i  nternal  di  stribution  of  expected  aggregate
profits.  However,  if  the expected profits  of  producer groups are  not
widely  disparate,  a  quantity-setting  strategy  also  yields  a  smaller
vari  ance  of profit  shares.
5.  lvl  ixed strategies
A mixed  strategy is one  whose  control vector contains  both a price  and
a quantjty.  There  are four mjxed  straLegies  in our two-pnoduct  model. But
because  there is no randomness  in the demand  for heavy  crude, two of  these14
are  redundant.  Both strategies that involve fixing  the quanLity  of heavy
crude  are equjvalent  to  a  pure  price-setting  strategy.  The  strategy
involving the price and  quantjty of light  crude  is also uninteresting  since
al  I  of the  randomness  i  n  fi nal  demand  woul  d  be  borne by  the  heavy
producers.  Our  analysis  will  then be confined  to the mixed  strategy  whose
control variables  are the price of heavy  and  the quantity of 1ight.
The  values  of P* and  L that maximize  expected  aggregate  profits  are the
same  as those in Table 1.  Maximal  expected  profits  under  this  strategy are
then identical to those  under  the pure  price and  quantjty strategies.  The
higher-order moments  of  the profit  distributions are d'if  ferent, however.
Our interest is  in the stability  properties  of the strategy, as measured  by
the covariance  of group  profits  and  the variance  of profit  shares.
Under the mixed  strategy, the profits  of the two producing  groups  wi11
exhibit positive covariance. This is clear from  eqs.  (7)-(8).  With  the
price  of  heavy and  the quantity of light  fixed, a positive devjation in
final  demand  raises the price of  1ight.  This,  in  turnr  increases the
quantity  of  heavy. The  revenues  of both groups  rise.  As measured  by the
covariance  of group profits,  short-term stabiI  ity  i  s  more effectively
promoted  by both the mixed  strategy and  the pure  quantity-setting strategy
than by the pure price-setting strategy.
A ranking  of the covariances  of the mixed  and  quantity  strategies  js
less straiqhtforwand. The  formal  condition can  be derived  from  Table  2 as(12)
15
Cov(rr,n,  )lr*,*  >  Cov(nu,r,  ) p* 1*  iff. '  n  L'  n  !L
0(  1+0)  + bc{  o2-  1+2obc  } 0.
VJhjch  of  the  strategies  yields a greater covariance  depends,  among  other
things, upon  the output-sharjng  parameter  0.  If  heavy  producers  necejve  at
least  one-half  of  expected output  (8  >  1), then the covariance  under
quantjty-setting will  exceed  the covariance  under  the mixed  strategy.  The
ranking  is reversed,  however,  for  sufficiently  small values  of 0.
In  order  to compare  strategies jn terms  of their  implied  variances  of
profit  shares,  v{e  must  once  again  restrjct  ourselves to  cases where the
expected profits  of  the  cartel are equally distributed between  producer
groups. As  may  be recalled from  eq.(11), the companisons  then involve only
the  variances of  aggregate  profits  and  the covariances  of group  profits.
It  is easy  to show  from  Table  2 that the variance  of aggregate profjts  is
smaller  under the  mixed strategy than under  the pure  quantity strategy.
Thi  s g  ives us the fol lowi  ng ranki  ng:
(  13) Var(n)
By  providing both a greater  covarjance between  members'  profits  and  a
smaller  variance  in  aggregate profits,  each of the mixed  and  quantity
strategjes  yields a variance  of profit  shares that  is  smaller  than  Lhe
variance  of shares  implicit  in a pure  price strategy.
P,1
nA  nank.ing  of  the  vari  ances
quant'ity  strategies js  less clear.
vari  ance of  aggregate profits.
assumed  in the derivation of eq.(11)
greater covariance  of group  profits.
to
of  profit  shares  between  the mjxed  and
The  mixed strategy  offers  a  smal  ler
But  when I  is greater than  one, as is
,  the  quantity  strategy  provides a
6. 0PEC'  s recent experj  ence  with pri  ce control  s
Since  lhe  oil  embargo  of 1973-74,  0PEC's  operating  strategy has  been
genena'l  1y one  of pegging  prices for different  types of crude  and  supportjng
these  prices vJith  the necessary  adjustments  in pnoduction. llost of jts  o  j'l
has  been  purchased  on long-term  contracts  at official  prices.  Differences
in  grades of  oil  and distances  to markets  have  been  accounted  for by a
schedule  of off  ic'ial price differentials  whjch  are adjusted  periodical1y  in
response to  fundamental  changes in  market conditjons.  Up  unti  1 7982,
OPEC's  experience  with prjce control  s was  a tranquil one.  The  period  was
characterized by increasing  demand  and, although  the extra revenues  of the
cartel were  not always  shared  evenly,  no  member  suffered  a  decline  in
revenues that was  not a consequence  of reduced  productive  capacity.  There
was  I  i  ttl e confl  i  ct wj  thi  n the organi  zati  on  .
The  destabilizing feature of a price-setting  stnategy became  evident
after  the  major  price  increases of  1979-1980. These  price increases
resulted jn an unexpectedly  strong  reduction  in the demand  for 0PEC  oi1, as
external sources  of oil  were  developed  and  as the world began  to substjtute
away  fnom  oil  and  and  ojl-related  products.  Substantial  cuts jn production
were  necessary  if  prices were  to remai  n at official  levels.  Moreover,  withrigid  price differentials,  the  required  production cuts  were unevenly
distributed  across  producing  groups. This was  particuiarly evident  during
the period immediately  preceeding  the price reductions  in March 1983.  As
shown in  Table 3, producers  of l ighter oils  (those  with a weight  greater
than 31 degrees  API) made  sjgnifjcant cuts in their  production from  June
7982 to  February 1983.  The  only  exceptjons  were  Iran and  lraq, whose
behavior  was  distorted by the war.  Producers  of heavy  cnudes,  on the other
hand,  actual  ly raised their production  levels during the period.
These changes  in lhe djstributjon  of revenues,  both  within and  outside
of 0PEC,  put destabi'l  izing pressure  on the cartel.  In response  to s'l  umping
sales,  the  U.K.,  a light  oi1 producer,  unilaterally  reduced  its  official
't1/
prices.-:'  Nigeria, a direct competitor  with the U.K., followed  with price
cuts  of  its  own. These  actions resulted in an emergency  agreement  to cut
the marker  pri  ce (Arab  Light)  by  gS/barrel  and  to  real  i  gn  the  pri  ce
di  fferenti al  s.  The  agreement  h,as reached after  threats of a compi  ete
co1  l  apse  of the organi  zati  on  .
More  recently, OPEC  has  begun  to move  toward  greater  use  of  quantity
controls.  There  is an increasing  acceptance  of sales  on the spot  market  by
members.  Before  1982,  nearly a1  l  of the o  iI  sol  d  was  through l  ong-term
contracts  at official  prices.  At the present  time, however,  nearly half is
sold  on  a  spot  market basis,  making the  official  price  structure
i  ncreasi  ngly  irrel evant.  The  organi  zatj  on  has  al  so hi  red an accounti  ng
firm to provide  a detailed monjtoring  of production  to make  information on
cheating by  individual  members  more readjly  available.  Although  the
accounting  firm is eventually  to monitor  prices, its  current emphasis  js on
oroduction.18
7. Concl  usions
In  order  to  reduce the costs of internal negotjatjons, a cartel may
choose  to fix  ejther jts  prices or quantities through  periods  of  changing
demand. This  paper has  explored  t,he  ways  in which  the distributions of
membersr  profits  are affected by the choice  between  variables that  are  to
be  predetermi  ned  and  vari  abl  es  that  are  to  adjust  to  actual market
condi  ti ons.  We  have  speci  fi cal  ly  focused  on the  effect  of  Lhe  strategy
choice  on the expected  aggregate  profits  of the cartel and  the variation in
its  jnternal djstnibution of profits,  as  measured  by  the  covariance of
members'  profits  and  the variance  of profit  shares.
Di  fferences  i  n  maxi  mum  expected orofi  ts  can  ari  se  i  f  there  are
nonl  inearities in either market  demand  or  in  the  cost  function  of  the
cartel  .  A strategy of set,ting  prices will  produce  larger expected  profits
jf  demand  is concave  in price and  costs are concave  in output.  lrlhen  demand
and  costs  are convex  in their  arguments,  however,  larger expected  profits
can  be obtained  by setting quantities.
If  cartel members  produce  different  products,  control  strategies  may
also  differ  in  the  evenness  with  which  fluctuations 'in  demand  affect
members'  profits.  This would  be parlicularly  tnue for 0PEC,  since  members
are  endowed  wiLh  different  proportjons  of heavy  and  l  ight crude.  In a
simple  model  designed  to capLure  the  sal  ient  aspecls of  the  world  oi  I
market,  quantity-setting was  shown  Lo  yield  a larger covariance  of membersl
profits  than price-setting.  Which  of the two strategies provides  a smaller
variance  of  profit  shares depends  upon agreements  concerning the
distnibution of expected  aggregate  profits  betvreen  members. However, jf19
the  expected profits  of  producer groups are not widely di  sparate,  the
quantity-settjng strategy  al  so  yields a smal  ler variance  of profit  shares.
As demonslrated  by the events  leading  up  to the March  1983 price  cut,
OPEC's  choice  of a price-setting strategy  resulted in light  oi1 producers
having  to bear  the bulk of the production  cuts necessitated  by  a  weakness
in  oil  demand  which developed  during  the ear"ly  1980s. This, in turn,
threatened  the stabi  lity  of the cartel.  It  would  be erroneous to  suggest
that,  by  setting  quantities  rather than prices, a1l problems  could  have
been  avoided. Profjts would  have  fallen  in any  case.  However,  with profjt
shares more  stabie, it  might  have  been  easier to negotiate  an agreement  on
prices and  quantitjes  that  were  more consi  stent  with  the  longer-term
structure of oi  I demand.20
Footnote  s
1.  See  0sborne  (1976)  for a useful discussion  of these  problems.
2.  This  djffers  from  the  method of analysjs used  by |r/eitzman.  In the
Weitzman  model,  it  is  in effect marginal  cost rather than price thaL is
set  and  defended through  variations in production.  When  a value for
marginal  cost is announced,  output is  selected  after costs are neal  ized
so as to be consistent  with that level of marginal  cost.  Price is then
determined  after demand  is  real  jzed as the highest  price which  can  be
charged for that output.  If  costs are nonrandom,  this  kind of control
strategy i  s equi  val  ent to quant  ity-setti ng.
3.  Some  OPEC  countries  produce  more  than one  grade  of oil.  Saudi Arabia,
for  exampie, produces  large amounts  of both heavy  and  lighL oi'l  .  For
most  members,  however,  it  is not possibie  to make major  substitutjons
between  grades.
4.  There  is little  loss of general  ity  in making  this assumption.  See  n.5.
5.  Had we  recognized  alternate sources  of oi1, the price coefficients in
(7)  and  (8)  would embody  the  production responses  of  external
suppiiers,  as  well  as characteri  stics of refining technology  and  the
price responsiveness  of fjnal  demand.  However,  the randomness  in final
demand  would continue to  express  itself  only through  the demand  for 'I 
ight crude,  and  this  is what  is crucjal for our results.
6.  For example,  see  Henfindahl  (1967)  and  Dasgupta  and  Heal  (1,979, pp.
J.72-175).
7.  The  principal  influence  of  production costs  on the chojce  beth,een
control sLrategies  is as in Sectjon  2,  Convexity (concavity)  in  the
cartelrs cost function tends  to favor quantity-setting (  p  r  i  c  e  -  s  e  t  t i  n  g  )  .
8.  For examp'le,  see  Danielson  (i980) and  Mohammad  (1984).
9.  Since  expected profits  are  the  same, it  would  not be necessary  to
standardj  ze  the  covari  ances before  compari  ng  them across control
st  rateg  i  es.
10. For a  derivation
p.181).
11.  The  U.K.  is not a
in I  ine  with 0PEC.
of  eq.(11),  see  l,4ood,  Graybill, and  Boes  (1974,
member  of 0PEC,  but it  tends  to set  official  prices27
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Appendi  x  :  Derivation  of Eq.(2)
To  derive eq.(2), first  consider  a second-order  Taylor approximation  of
the quanti  ty-settj ng profj  t  functi  on  , r  =  Qf-i(a-Q)  .  Expand  about  the
point  O,ql,  where E  is  the mean  of the random  variable o andQ is the
expected  quantity under  the optimal price-settjng straLegy.  Now take  the
expected value  of  the  approximated  function.  All  terms  involving (o-c)
wi  I  I  van  i  sh.  The  resul  ti ng expressi  on can  be  wri  tten as
(A1) e(.,)  " ar-1(*-81  . frro-O1  . ,*  "'. t$  to-012
A n  umbe  r
of  (A1)




of simplifjcations are now  possible.  The  first  term  on the r.h.s.
is the maximal  value  of expected  profits  under  price-setting.  By
fjrst-order  condition  to the price-setting problem, it  is  also
show  that the first-order  partial  derivative in (A1) vanishes  when
at (;,a).  Fina11y, it  can  be  shown from  the  second-order
to the price-setting problem  that the coefficient on (Q-[)z must
be negative.  It  lhen fol lows  that,  to a  second-order  approximation, the
optimal  quantity-setting strategy is to set quantity equal  to its  expected
value under  the optimal  price-setting strategy.  Eq.(2) in the text follows
from  thi  s resul  t.fJ
Table  1;  Optimal  Prices  and  Quantities
efi  = o-11aZuyt(r+e;2  +  o(e-1)bc)
H*  = D-10(  1+o);
whereD=z(t*e)ztzeZbc
pt  = o-1(aZu)t(l+e)2  +  2s2s.1
L*  = D-  1(  1+o  )tTabl  e 2:
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Tabl  e 3:
OPEC  capacity  utiljzatjon  in period preceeding  March  1983  price cut
Ava  i  I  abl  e
Capa  c  i  ty**
Country  ldei  qht*  (  1000  bbl  /dav)
^---^r!.,  ll+i  1  i--+i^^
r.clPcL  I r-y
June  1982  February  1983
(  Percent) (  Percent)
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The  weight  reported  in the tab'l  e indicates the most  predominant  weight
traded  on an official  basis.  Most  countries  have  multiple grades
ranging  from light  to heavy.  PIW  reports prices for over 100  "major"
grades  traded  by OPEC.
Avai  I  abl  e capaci  ty  i  s based  on exi  sti ng j  nfrastrucLure  and
includes  announced  production  ceiiings by some  members.  It  represents
the maximum  production  lhat could be sustained  without
new  investment  in productjon  or transportation  facilities.  The
available capacity  figure used  is for March  1983.
Sources: Petno  I  eum  Intelligence |/ieekly
International Enerqy  Statjslical  Review,  U.S.  Central




















Figure  1: Effects  of  a
Pri^a-q6++iFd
Change  in  Demand under
and  Quantity-S  ett  ing